Monday, June 29, 2009

UNMIT Tall Tales

Since the start of UNMIT in August 2006, the UN Police have been working side-by-side with the National Police of Timor-Leste [DI note: in everywhere but the subdistricts where UNPOL does not have fulltime presence] to support the strengthening of the national police service. National officers have undergone a series of extensive training exercises (pictured) designed to bolster operational readiness.
Photo by Antoninho Bernardino/UNMIT

Click here to visit the UNMIT Photo of the Day Gallery

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Senhora Z

Xanana Gusmao's daughter, Zenilda (pictured above), implicated in rice corruption claims

Friday, June 26, 2009

Squeamish Gourmands? Not in Timor!

Why be squeamish about eating dog?

Thursday, June 25, 2009

CPD-RDTL Demo Junho 2009



Wednesday, June 24, 2009


A sign of international disengagement from TL? Concern, AUSTCARE and ASF are all closing their offices in dili in next 6 months.

Friday, June 19, 2009

Martial Arts Group fighting in Maliana

UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator.

Obrigado Barracks, Caicoli Street, Dili, Timor-Leste

Telephone: (+670) 3312 481: Fax (+670) 3312 408:

Timor-Leste Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)

Tuesday, 9 June 2009, 1030-1200

UNMIT Conference Room D

UNMIT Political Affairs

Finally there was an incident involving Martial Arts Group fighting in Maliana over the weekend. Some issues arose regarding the involvement of the F-FDTL in the incident. This is currently being looked into.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

What did they all do?

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Naktuka Border Dispute

The Jakarta Globe

June 13, 2009

Village Warns of Violence If Border Issue Not Settled

by Eras Poke


The leader of a remote subdistrict bordering East Timor says his people are ready to take up arms if the ownership of a disputed piece of land isn't settled.

The Armed Forces (TNI) has barred a community in East Amfoang subdistrict, East Nusa Tenggara, from using the land in disputed Naktuka village.

But Robby J. Manoh, a village head on the Indonesian side of the border, said he did not understand why the East Timorese were allowed to remain in Naktuka.

People from East Timor are starting to plant on Naktuka soil, but our government has done nothing to stop them," Robby said.

This is not fair. If this injustice continues, we have no choice but to force [the Timorese] to leave the area."

Police in East Amfoang confirmed the Timorese presence in Naktuka, but were told last month by the military that such cases were common along the border.

Daud Saul Ndaumanu, the subdistrict chief of police, said that the problem had persisted since 2006.

Regulation has it that [Naktuka] should be clear of any establishments or activities initiated by either country," Ndaumanu said.

But for some reason, that hasn't stopped the people of East Timor from staying in these disputed areas. I think the government should intervene in this matter."

Robby also appealed to authorities to look into the situation. We're in a tough position because we cannot take care of our own land," he said. "We've brought this up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but nothing has been done to settle this issue."

Kupang district police and the governor's office have not reported any violence in the area.

The Jakarta Post

Saturday, June 13, 2009

TNI Told To Evict Disputed Border Settlers In NTT

KUPANG: Legislators in East Nusa Tenngara (NTT) have urged Indonesian military (TNI) to expel hundreds of Timor Leste people who have "unilaterally" built settlements along a
disputed area bordering Indonesia and its former province.

"The TNI should act firmly. If there is already an agreement that the neutral zone still under the status of dispute should be clear of any civilian activities, the two countries mustabide by it," senior NTT legislative council member Jonathan Kanan said Friday.

Jonathan, deputy chairman of the council's security affairs commission, said that unless the TNI took firm action, the disputed 1,069-square-meter area, "rich of mining resources", could be occupied by Timor Leste.

"An international court only recognizes the ownership of a certain area if there are activities there. Never allow for the case of Sipadan and Ligitan [islands that Indonesia lost to Malaysia] to recur," he said.

Council deputy speaker Kristo Blasin asked the Foreign Ministry to pay serious attention to the issue.

"Never let bloodshed break out. This problem can actually be settled through diplomacy," he said.

Kristo called on the two countries to involve communities in finding a solution to the disputed border at Naktuka village in East Amfoang subdistrict in the NTT capital of Kupang. Timor
Leste claims the area as part of its Oecusi district.

Earlier, Indonesia's security border force lodged a protest with Timor Leste police, which had allowed its citizens to build settlements in the disputed area. - JP

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Ekipa Diak Liu


SMS message from a friend of a friend.

Two black Humvees, with Timor license plates, just drove past us in Aileu.”

14 June 2009.

Monday, June 15, 2009


From: sara = =]
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 2:44 PM
To: [a lot of people]
Subject: Call for Volunteer Assistance for METINARO CLOSURE
Importance: High

Please also disseminate this message to all your colleagues.

Dear colleagues,

As you are aware, the closure of Metinaro camp will begin on Tuesday, June 16th. Beginning next week, June 22nd, we are requesting the assistance of colleagues from UN Agencies, local and international NGOs, for the Return Monitoring teams that will accompany the return process of the IDPs back to their communities. Volunteer Monitors can work for the whole week, a few days, or even a single day. Please indicate your preferred day when you answer this email. You do not need to have experience working in the camps to offer your assistance.

The process is as follows:

- Those who wish to volunteer for assistance should contact, stating which organization they belong to and which day(s) they will be available for.

- Once this has been confirmed with you by IOM, Volunteer Monitors will report to the Monitoring tent (located on the main road before the turning to the cemetery on the map).

- Each monitor will be assigned a truck number, and must remain in the Monitoring Area waiting to be called in.

- As trucks are being called into the camp to assist a family or families, the Monitor team leader will call a Monitor to join his/her truck.

- While the trucks are being loaded by the family/families, Monitors must ensure that the following forms are completed in conjunction with the family/families:

1) Voluntary Return Form

2) Destination List Form

(These forms will be explained in more detail upon arrival at the Monitoring tent.)

- The Monitor will accompany the family/families in the trucks to the food distribution point, liaise with IOM staff there, and then continue the journey to the family/families’ destination.

Should there be any problems/issues upon arrival, the Monitor will contact a member of the Return and Reintegration team immediately. (Numbers to be provided in a contact card.)

- The Monitor then returns to the Monitoring tent with the truck, and awaits further assignment.

To note:

- If you are UN and have access to a radio, please bring it, and include your call sign in the email.

- If you cannot ensure your own transport to and from Metinaro, please indicate so in your email.

- Please bring your own lunch.

Please respond as soon as you can so we can draw up an assignment list for next week. This email will be translated soon and disseminated again.

Thanks and best regards,

Sara Ferro Ribeiro

International Organization for Migration - IOM

Dili, Timor-Leste

ph: +670 731 1580


Dragon in Timor?

Thoughts on China and Timor from a graduate of Peoples Liberation Army National Defense University (PLANDU).


"China strongly opposed the opening of a Taiwanese Trade and Cultural exchange office in Dili and aggressively moved to bar an unofficial Taiwanese delegation from visiting the country in early 2006".

"Chinese companies are interested in exploiting Timor-Leste’s rich natural resources, particularly oil and gas"

"In 2006, intermediaries for PetroChina told the Timorese authorities that the company would be willing to exploit the onshore oil fields if the Dili government were to grant the Chinese exclusivity rights to the exploitation of all oil and natural gas resources found onshore."

“China is willing to assist Timor-Leste in any way beneficial to the government and people of this country. If the Timorese believe that a refinery is in their best interest, we shall study their request carefully and respond in the spirit of friendship and solidarity to the mutual
benefit of our brotherly nations”

"The resulting domestic and international criticism of the government’s decision [to buy Chinese patrols boats] makes it rather unlikely that the government will make any major weapons purchases from the PRC in the near future"

FALINTIL-FDTL "2", UNMIT Police "0".

Is UNPOL not "in charge" in Bobonaro?

At 1045 7 June 09 fighting between martial arts groups PSHT and KS in Maliana Market. 2 PSHT injured. UNPOL, PNTL and F-FDTL responded.

Sira joga bola nafatin. Se mak manan?

Sunday, June 14, 2009

XG Confident on Rapid Solution for Guinea Bissau

"The important leaders of Guinea Bissau and heroes of the struggle for liberation" as noted below were also very busy creating and profiting from the creation of West Africa's first real narco-state. Parabens.

-----Original Message-----
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 10:54 PM
Subject: XG Confident on Rapid Solution for Guinea Bissau

Africa: East Timor Defence Minister Confident on Rapid Solution for Guinea Bissau

27 May 2009

Luanda ­ East Timor's Premier and Defence and Security Minister, Xanana Gusmão, on Wedneday in Luanda, expressed his higher solidarity to Guinea Bissau, confident that the political-military crisis in that African country would be solved rapidly, Angop has learnt.

"I reiterate my deep condemnation against the attempts that claimed the lives of important
leaders of Guinea Bissau and heroes of the struggle for liberation", he said while addressing a speech at the opening of the 11th meeting of the defence ministers with the Portuguese-speaking Countries Community (CPLP). 7 Aug 2007

Guinea-Bissau has become the first African narco-state, where South American traffickers have set up their headquarters and hideouts for large-scale cocaine smuggling operations into the European Union (EU).The former Portuguese colony in West Africa is the fifth poorest country in the world, with a per capita income of just 856 dollars a year. Yet the country is awash with cash.This flow of wealth is not benefiting the people, who have become used to seeing powerful and expensive vehicles in the streets of the capital, Bissau, and luxury mansions owned by people linked to the Government, who mysteriously got rich overnight.The basically unguarded coastline of this small country of 36,125 square kilometres and 1.5 million people has become the main stepping stone on cocaine’s long journey from Latin America’s Andean region to its destination in Portugal or Spain.In response to allegations by activists and journalists of complicity between people in positions of power and the South American drug lords, President Joao Bernardo Vieira, Prime Minister Martinho Ndafa Cabi and Foreign Minister Maria da Conceiçao Nobre Cabral have only said that they are "prepared to fight the problem."A report on the phenomenon by renowned Portuguese international analyst Ana Dias Cordeiro published by the Lisbon newspaper Público Thursday said the "shroud of silence" on drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau has included threats and pressure on judges "not to investigate people involved in the drug trade."

Sound familiar. Thanks be that South America is a long way a way.

NT businessman's Dili resort dream

Isn't beach property - the property of the Government?

"signed a 55-year lease on a 12,000sqm waterfront property"

Northern Territory News, NT businessman's Dili resort dream

NICK CALACOURAS, May 29th, 2009

A TERRITORY businessman wants to build a series of beachfront holiday villas in East Timor.

Darwin property developer Henry Yap said he expected East Timor's tourism industry to be flourishing within five to 10 years. "It is something that will definitely happen," he said. "If they do it right, they have huge potential in this area."

Mr Yap, who fled East Timor as a 10-year-old in 1975, last year signed a 55-year lease on a 12,000sqm waterfront property located 3km east of Dili and wants to build 60 individual one-bedroom units with water views.

Friday, June 12, 2009

Motivational Speaker for Hire.

Fee Range "E", is it taxable?

UNMIT police will continue to have significant responsibilities for interim law enforcement

No mention of FALINTIL-FDTL.

Do you think Mr. Moon knows not one single UNPOL was ever permanently posted in the subdistricts of Timor-Lest since UNMIT started?

Letter dated 20 May 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2009/261)

Source: United Nations Security Council
Date: 21 May 2009

I have the honour to refer to
Security Council resolution 1867 (2009) of 26 February 2009 on the situation in Timor-Leste. By that resolution, the Security Council underscored that the concept of operations and rules of engagement for the military liaison group and the police component of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) need to be regularly updated as necessary and be fully in line with the provisions of the resolution. In the same resolution, the Council also requested me to report to it and to troop- and police-contributing countries within 90 days of the adoption of the resolution.

As the Security Council did not make any changes to the roles and tasks of the military liaison group, no adjustments were required to the military concept of operations. The concept of operations of the police component, however, has been carefully reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNMIT to meet the requirements of the mandate of the Mission, as outlined in Security Council resolution 1867 (2009).

The resolution supports the gradual resumption of policing responsibility by the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) through a phased approach, while emphasizing that PNTL must meet the criteria mutually agreed by the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT. To ensure that the process is jointly owned and implemented, Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão and my Special Representative concluded an agreement on 13 May 2009 that provides a basic framework for the resumption process and the respective roles and responsibilities of PNTL and UNMIT police, in accordance with the agreement concluded on 1 December 2006 entitled "Arrangement on the Restoration and Maintenance of Public Security in Timor-Leste and Assistance to the Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding of the Timorese National Police and the Ministry of the Interior" supplementing the agreement between the United Nations and Timor-Leste on the status of UNMIT and further to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1867 (2009) and paragraph 21 of my report on UNMIT dated 9 February 2009

In line with this agreement, a revised concept of operations for the police component of UNMIT is being prepared and is close to being finalized. It provides clear strategic objectives as well as the necessary operational guidance for the smooth implementation of the gradual resumption of policing responsibility by PNTL. It also clearly sets out the gradual change in the roles and responsibilities of PNTL and the UNMIT police whereby the latter will assume an increasing role in monitoring, advising and providing operational support to PNTL.

The rules of engagement for the police component did not require any revisions at this time, as the UNMIT police will continue to have significant responsibilities for interim law enforcement until PNTL has been fully reconstituted.

In close consultation with UNMIT, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will continue to review, on a regular basis, the concept of operations and the rules of engagement to ensure that they adequately reflect the evolving situation as the resumption process progresses in order to enable UNMIT to carry out its mandate in the most effective manner. The Department will keep Security Council members, as well as troop- and police-contributing countries, informed.

(Signed) Ban Ki-moon


So at least one civil servant has a BMW Z4, but at least the Government has X3's. Ida ne'e poverty "alleviation" duni!

Thursday, June 11, 2009

"FOSEO apela ba Governu RDTL atu tau matan ho seriu ba problema transporte maritima Oe-Cussi - Dili"

Not many will realize this but the Oe-Cusse Ferry not has been functioning for nearly 2 months.

These means that 60,000 citizens of Timor-Leste (6% of the total population) have had little or no access to their capital city, as few have passports and the money necessary to make the land journey, and even fewer have access to UN flights. Seems the ship is in Indonesia being repaired according to Indonesian “jam karet”.

So much for the Special Status of Oe-Cusse by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. To be fair the Government is planning a ship maintenance facilty in Tibar, but what will that do to the reefs and beaches in the area.

The last line reads.

There is a plan to make a protest action if the Government does not serious respond to this problem quickly.

“planu atu halo aksaun protesta sei karik Governu la responde ho seriu ba problema ne’e iha tempu lais.”

For more information call the spokesman for the Oecusse Students Solidarity Forum Ozi da Cruz Salu iha: telemovel +670 7347176

--- On Mon, 8/6/09, itngo timo <> wrote:

From: itngo timo <>
Subject: [ETSA] “FOSEO apela ba Governu RDTL atu tau matan ho seriu ba problema transporte maritima Oe-Cussi – Dili”
Date: Monday, 8 June, 2009, 3:16 AM


Komunikadu Imprensa
Atu Hasai Imediatamente

Dili, 5 Juñu 2009

“FOSEO apela ba Governu RDTL atu tau matan ho seriu ba problema transporte maritima Oe-Cussi – Dili”

Forum Solidariedade Estudante Enclave Oe-cussi (FOSEO) ne’ebé sai mahon ba estudante
Oe-cussi oan sira iha Dili oras ne’e dadaun preokupa teb-tebes ho situasaun transporte maritima ne’ebe durante ne’e sai meius transporte prinsipal entre Oe-Cussi no Dili.

Tanba operasaun Fery Nakroma ne’ebé paradu besik fulan rua ona, estudante Oe-cussi oan barak mak la bele hala’o aktividade eskola ho diak tanba osan transporte no hahan ne’ebé komesa hotu.

Konsekuensia a’at husi problema ne’e la’os deit afekta estudante sira maibe ema Oe-cussi hotu iha Dili no mos Oe-cussi.

Relasiona ho asuntu ne’e, FOSEO apela maka’as ba Governu RDTL atu ho seriedade buka dalan atu rezolve problema ne’e iha tempu lais.

Porta Voz FOSEO Ozi da Cruz Salu hateten katak, “Dezafiu bo’ot ida ne’e mos dezafia prosesu dezenvolvimentu povu Rejiaun Oe-cussi iha seitor oi-oin, liu-liu dezenvolvimentu administrativa no ekonomia povu Atoni Oe-cussi iha baze.”

Organizasaun ne’e oferta alternativa ida mak atu Governu RDTL buka ro seluk atu substitui Fery Nakroma durante Fery ne’e halo manutensaun.

Foin lalais ne’e, FOSEO organiza enkontru ida ho reprezentante Oe-cussi oan iha Kapital Dili husi grupu oi-oin atu bele diskuti kona-ba asuntu ne’e no rona preokupasaun Oe-cussi oan sira relasiona ho problema ne’ebé refere.

Durante enkontru ne’ebe akontese iha Dormitoriu Oe-cussi oan iha Kampung Merdeka Comoro ne’e, FOSEO konsegue hamosu Deklarasaun Pozisaun ida atu bele hato’o ba Governu.

Deklarasaun ne’e inklui ejijensia balun kona-ba saida mak FOSEO hanoin governu presiza halo atu bele hapara lalais problema transporte Oe-cussi – Dili. Deklarasaun ne’e mos hakerek kona-ba planu atu halo aksaun protesta sei karik Governu la responde ho seriu ba problema ne’e iha tempu lais.

Ba informasaun barak liu tan kona-ba asuntu ne’e, favor kontaktu Porta Voz FOSEO, Ozi da Cruz Salu iha: telemovel +670 7347176

Friendly SuperPower?

One has to wonder what Canberra, Jakarta and Washington DC have to think about it all.

-----Original Message---
Sent: Tuesday, June 09, 2009 10:39 PM
Subject: China plans to continue providing development aid to East Timor

China plans to continue providing development aid

to World East Timor [ 2009-06-08 ]

Beijing, China, 8 June – The Chinese vice president, Xi Jinping Friday in Beijing pledged that China would continue to provide aid to East Timor at a meeting with the East Timorese Foreign Affairs Minister.

As developing countries, China and East Timor “are going through a period of great economic development and improvement of the living conditions of their populations,” said Xi Jinping cited by official Chinese news agency Xinhua.

He also noted a wish to "extend" cooperation with East Timor, a country rich in natural resources such as oil and natural gas, sources of energy that are needed for China’s development.

Zacarias da Costa said that his country valued its relationship with China and that it planned to boost cooperation in politics, trade and development of human resources.

China has supported East Timor in the construction of infrastructures in the country such as State buildings and in 2008 trade between the two countries totalling over US$900,000 in 2008. (macauhub)

Uluk iha '99 nian FPDK, maibe agora nian Gerindra fali.

Seems some news slipped through the cracks.

Armindo Soares Mariano – profile below in Masters of Terror – - was elected as a member of the Gerindra Party (Prabowo Subianto) to the legislative assembly member for East Nusa Tenggara recently

Armindo Soares Mariano

Speaker, East Timor provincial parliament (DPRD)

The central issue Armindo Soares should be asked to clarify is the allegation that he was, with Dili district head Domingos Soares, one of the two main leaders cooperating with East Timor military commander Tono Suratman in organising the militias in East Timor in 1999. These two and governor Abilio Soares (none related, despite the same name), were the three most prominent East Timorese officials in the territory in the period leading up to the ballot on 30 August 1999.

Armindo Soares was a strong supporter of the 'special autonomy' design being discussed at the UN late in 1998.[1] When that proposal was overtaken by President Habibie's dramatic decision to offer the East Timorese a choice of autonomy or independence, he expressed his strong disapproval.[2] In late February he began an aggressive Golkar campaign to 'socialise' the autonomy option in East Timor.[3]

The campaign involved several incidents of serious violence. He promoted the violence by his vigorous defence of the need to arm pro-Indonesian militias. Immediately after Habibie's announcement on 30 January 1999, Armindo Soares defiantly rejected the demand by armed forces commander General Wiranto that these forces should be disarmed without Falintil being disarmed first.[4]

According to some reports he was a member of a large group of prominent East Timorese civilians that came to Jakarta to meet with armed forces commander General Wiranto on 19 February 1999. Asking Wiranto to reverse his position on the arming of civilians, they wanted him to supply them with arms. Wiranto said he did not agree with the weapons request, but East Timor governor Abilio Soares later claimed large numbers of weapons were made available anyway by Armed Forces Chief of General Staff LtGen Sugiono (where the names are listed in detail).[5]

After the Liquica massacre of 6 April 1999, Armindo Soares supported statements by military commander Col Tono Suratman that played down the number of victims ('five') and described foreign reporting on it as 'pure lies'.[6]

Soares was present on 17 April 1999 at one of the first large militia shows of strength in Dili. Afterwards, militias murdered twelve people at the nearby home of former provincial parliamentarian Manuel Carrascalao. Soares refused to condemn either the rally or the violence afterwards, saying: 'Why make a fuss about the rally? This shows that the pro-integration forces are also consolidating to defend themselves'.[7]

Militia leader Eurico Guterres himself reportedly said the blame for the massacre on 17 April should be shared with Domingos Soares and Armindo Soares.[8] Strengthening Eurico Guterres' claim, one report shortly after alleged that the 17 April event was part of a campaign called Operasi Sisir planned by the military under Col Tono Suratman in conjunction with militia leaders. It then named Armindo Soares as one of the two key militia leaders cooperating with Suratman, together with Domingos Soares. Meetings were being held to plan another round of violence in May, the report added.[9]

When Unamet arrived soon afterwards, it criticised the 'socialisation' campaign as the kind of premature action ruled out by the 5 May UN agreement. The criticism led Armindo Soares to lash out at Unamet as being under the influence of pro-independence groups.[10]

As chief of Golkar in East Timor, Soares' job was to ensure that all Golkar members and their families voted for Indonesia. A large proportion of the urban workforce in East Timor was employed in the civil service, and all of them were expected to be Golkar supporters. This led Armindo Soares to state after the ballot that the pro-autonomy vote should have been well over 100,000 (instead of less than half that), a figure that formed the basis of his argument that Unamet had 'cheated' in the ballot.[11]

Armindo Soares frequently took part in meetings to coordinate strategy among militia leaders, the police and the military. One such meeting reportedly took place on 24 July 1999.[12]

Just before the ballot, on 26 August 1999, he was one of four speakers at another large pro-autonomy rally that turned violent, this time on the Pramuka Field in Dili. Afterwards, militias went on a rampage, joined by Brimob police and soldiers. Five civilians were killed.[13]

Soares was a vigorous organiser, frequently traveling between Dili and Jakarta. Late in February 1999 he helped set up the pro-autonomy organisation FPDK. In June he helped set up the pro-Indonesian umbrella group Unif. In August, just before the ballot, Soares formed an 'alliance' of most of the political parties that had taken part in the national election earlier that month. The alliance expressed support for autonomy.

Unif rejected the ballot result. In October 1999 he (unsuccessfully) lobbied the Indonesian supreme legislative body MPR to reject it too and instead hold a national (Indonesian) referendum on the issue of East Timor's separation.[14]


Under the Portuguese, Armindo Soares was a young primary school teacher. As Portugal prepared to decolonise East Timor in 1974 he joined Apodeti, which promoted autonomy within Indonesia. He was not a significant figure at the time. After the Indonesian military invasion he held a series of bureaucratic positions, at first within the Education Department. By the mid-1990s he had risen to second assistant to the provincial secretary (Asisten II Sekwilda Timtim), and had become chairman of Golkar's East Timor branch. He was twice a candidate for provincial governor (1992 and 1997) but lost each time to Abilio Soares, with whom he maintained a prickly relationship. In July 1997, on the recommendation of the armed forces faction in parliament, he was appointed speaker of the provincial parliament.[15]

When President Suharto resigned in May 1998, students began a determined and popular push for a referendum in East Timor. Armindo Soares publicly rejected the demand as 'dreaming', and instead backed the hard line within Golkar. He had the moderate Golkar national parliamentarian and newspaper proprietor Salvador Ximenes Soares 'recalled' from his post in Jakarta for 'disloyalty to Golkar'.[16]

Militia leader dies. Going to a very hot destination?

[This message was distributed via the east-timor news list. For info on how to subscribe send a blank e-mail to To support ETAN see ]

From: [] On Behalf Of John M Miller
Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2009 9:38 PM
Subject: Joao Taveres - militia leader dies

Former E Timor integration fighters` chief dies

Monday, June 8, 2009 22:04 WIB National Viewed 59 time(s)
Kupang (ANTARA News) - Former commander of East Timor Integration Fighters , Joao Tavares, died at around 8.20 pm on Monday in Atambua at the age of 78 following a stroke.

"He had been suffering from stroke for a long time before he died," one of his friends, Armindo Mariano Soares, said when contacted about Tavares` demise.

Armindo who was former chairman of the East Timor legislative assembly when the province was part of Indonesia described Tavares as a tough integration fighter.

"The late Tavares loved the Red and While (Indonesia) deeply. The love was rooted deeply in his heart as shown by his struggle to defend East Timor`s integration into Indonesia. Because of that Pak Tawares chose to move to Atambua after the referendum in East Timor in 1999 until he died," he said.

Armindo who is now a member of the Indonesian East Nusa Tenggara`s provincial legislative assembly from Golkar Party said when the civil war broke out in East Timor in 1975 Tavares who was from the Uni Democrat Timorence Party (UDT) once fled to Atambua.

When integration occured in 1976 through the Balibo Declaration Tavares returned to East Timor along with his forces to fight Fretilin which was anti-integration.

At the time, Armindo said, Tavares was directly assigned to be the head of the Bobonaro regency with his office located in Maliana. "He was head of Bobonaro regency for around 13 years," he added.

He said when East Timor was still a Portuguese colony Tavares was once a member of the colonal forces.

After the vote in 1999 that led to East Timor`s independence Tavares and his forces and also the people who supported integration left East Timor for East Nusa Tenggara and lived in Atambua which borders with Bobonaro.

While in a refuge Tavares was one of the advisors for UNTAS, an organization for East Timorese in exile, Armindo said.

Tavares survived by a wife, a number of children, one of them elected as member of the legislative assembly in Belu in the recent elections representing the Democrat Party.

"I do not know all his family members but his is a big family and one of his sons was chosen as a legislative assembly member in Belu for the period of 2009-2010," he said.

Armindo himself is now a member of the Gerindra Party and was also elected as a legislative assembly member for East Nusa Tenggara recently.(*)

Joao da Silva Tavares

Leader, Halilintar militia, Bobonaro district; supreme commander, PPI militia forces, East Timor

Joao Tavares was an ageing militia leader whose name inspired fear and hate in many East Timorese.

On 10 or 12 August 1998, in the face of rising independence demands following Suharto's resignation the previous May, he allegedly met Maj-Gen Adam Damiri and Col Tono Suratman, who told him and two other militia leaders, Eurico Guterres and Cancio de Carvalho they must organise 'to protect integration'. This meeting represented the official launch of the militias - part of a strategy worked out by Generals Syamsuddin and Zacky Anwar Makarim between July and September 1998.[1]

On 17 February 1999 Joao Tavares reportedly told a meeting of sub-district and village heads in Bobonaro that they would be sacked if they failed to mobilise their citizens to attend a pro-government rally in Balibo. On February 19 he told a Balibo rally that there would be war if people rejected the autonomy proposal.[2]

On 27 February 1999, witnessed by senior military officers and hundreds of militia members, he was installed as head of an East Timor-wide militia organisation. This formally made him responsible for all unlawful acts committed by the many militia groups around East Timor for the remainder of 1999.[3]

On 1 March 1999 Joao Tavares at a meeting said at least one Australian diplomat had to be 'sacrificed' in order to stop a civil war among East Timorese caused by Australia[n support for the ballot].[4]

On 11 March 1999 Tavares received a letter from the militia leader Lafaek Saburai (Afonso Pinto), informing the 'highly respected pro-integration war general' of plans to remove pro-integrationist (pro-Indonesian) people from Dili. It then went on to say that the rest 'whether they be men, women, children or old people, are anti-integration and must be eliminated', beginning on 1 May 1999.

On 19 March 1999 Halilintar members acting jointly with TNI personnel murdered four pro-independence villagers in Mariabo village (also named as Moleana-Maliubun) near Maliana.[5]

On 12 April 1999 he and LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian personally ordered the execution of four East Timorese civilians from the village of Cailaco near Maliana, in revenge for a Falintil attack on a pro-Indonesian militia leader.[6] On 15-17 April 1999 the same militia tortured five people from the village of Aidabalete, Bobonaro district.[7] A long list of Halilintar militia members indicted in Dili for this massacre and a subsequent rampage around Cailaco subdistrict is given in a footnote under LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian.

On 17 April 1999 Joao Tavares and Eurico Guterres spoke at a large militia rally in front of Governor Abilio Soares� office in Dili. At this rally Joao Tavares was made supreme commander of the combined pro-integration forces PPI (Pasukan Pro-Integrasi), a military-backed umbrella grouping of militias. Eurico Guterres was made his deputy. After the rally, which was attended by all the top provincial officials, militias now nominally under his command murdered at least twelve people in the house of Manuel Carrascalao. On the same day Halilintar militias directly under his command destroyed equipment at the only local newspaper, forcing it to close down. A few days later his militias destroyed the house of a journalist with the same newspaper who lived in Maliana.[8]

Despite his record of violence, the state party Golkar did not hesitate to put him on its ticket for the 7 June 1999 election.[9]

On 17 July 1999 he allegedly wrote a letter to all his militia forces, with copies to all military and police commanders, ordering them to step up 'terror and intimidation' against pro-independence leaders, and informing them of plans to launch widespread violence should the independence option win. The letter may have been a fake.[10]

On 8 September 1999 he and Eurico Guterres reportedly met MajGen Adam Damiri and told him they had ordered their militias to stop the destruction of East Timor. He was lying. Militias under his PPI umbrella were murdering people at the Maliana police station as he spoke. This meeting once more demonstrated the close and hierarchical relationship between militias and the military.[11] In July 2003 Joao Tavares was indicted in absentia in Dili with crimes against humanity for his active leadership role in the militias in Bobonaro district, which led to a string of abuses culminating in the massacre at the Maliana police station on 8 September (see many details in LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian).

Following the Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor, Joao Tavares first openly supported armed incursions into East Timor, by '59,500' troops under his command. Many of them were ethnic East Timorese who had defected from the Indonesian armed forces after the withdrawal.[12]

He was questioned by KPP HAM in December 1999, where he did not deny his militias had engaged in destruction of East Timor after the ballot, but (implausibly) denied they had any contact with TNI at all.

He claimed that militias under PPI were disbanded on 13 November 1991. However, in October 2000 four militia leaders contemplating a return to East Timor said Joao Tavares had threatened them with 'extrajudicial action' for acting treasonously, thus demonstrating that the militias remained a coherent organisation.[13] In December 2000 his name was linked to a fresh surge in militia incursions into East Timor. It was alleged he had distributed more money to militias.[14]

  • Augusto Asameta Tavares, a Halilintar militia member, was on 18 June 2001 sentenced to 16 years prison by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court for murdering Paulino, a CNRT supporter, in Memo village near Maliana on 7 September 1999.[15]
  • Paulo Gonsalves, Marcelino Leto Bili Purificasao, Rosalino Pires, respectively the commander, deputy commander and a member of the Halilintar militia based in the village of Hataz, Atabae sub-district, were indicted by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in Dili for crimes against humanity on 12 June 2002. They were accused of detaining, beating, and repeatedly raping alleged Falintil supporters, often at the Halilintar post in Aidabasalala village in Atabae sub-district, between February and late September 1999. The mostly female victims were numbered 1 to 11.[16]

Several Halilintar militia members under Tavares' command are listed in Appendix 5 of the KPP HAM report with the recommendation they be prosecuted for crimes against humanity. They murdered two individuals in Bobonaro District on 21 April 1999, as well as committing other abuses. They are:[17]

  • Flaviano Dasilelo
  • Adao Babo
  • Paulo


Born into a wealthy farming family in Atabae village, western East Timor, on 6 April 1932 (another report says 1931), he is said to have married the daughter of an aristocrat (Raja Atambua) from (Indonesian) West Timor. Indeed he has several wives, and his constant need for money made him easy prey to military manipulators. He has a son, Jose da Silva Tavares, in the Foreign Affairs Department. A younger brother, Jorge Tavares, also led a militia band, as did another son, Rui Basilio Tavares. By 1999 he was described by one observer as 'a sick old man at the beck and call of the TNI', a militia leader who 'did not have a grasp of militia activities in wider East Timor'.[18]

As a pro-Indonesian 'partisan' in 1975 (he belonged to UDT), he supported the Indonesian army incursion into East Timor in October 1975. The Dunn Report says about this episode: 'The way East Timorese were used in this operation marked the beginning of a TNI policy of using willing Timorese in operations conceived and planned by military commanders, in which the former provided a political front designed to mask the leading role of the Indonesian military.'[19]

While still leading the Halilintar militias he was made district head for Bobonaro (1978-1988) - a mixing of military and civilian roles never thought incompatible under the Indonesian occupation. However, real power resided with several military officers stationed in every district. He became a wealthy landowner. After his term as district head he became a member of the East Timor provincial parliament.[20]

The Halilintar militia was inactive through the 1980s, but was revived in 1995, again with Joao Tavares at its head. Since then he built a record of lethal violence, especially well documented throughout 1999. The militia he led was closely integrated with the Indonesian armed forces.[21]

On 4 January 1998, a combined team of the Rajawali battalion, a territorial battalion, SGI (Special Intelligence Unit) and Halilintar militiamen, led by Joao Tavares, tortured and shot dead four suspected pro-independence East Timorese men near the Nunura-Bebai River in Coilima, Atabae sub-district, Bobonaro.[22]

Extra Information

Implicated in Events:
Cailaco - 13/04/1999 - Public execution of 5 (6?) suspected pro-independence supporters, Cailaco, Bobonaro

Maliana - 8/09/1999 - Maliana police station massacre

Current Status:
T -
Committed for trial in East Timor, some already sentenced.

K - KPP HAM. Listed in the 31/01/2000 report of the Indonesian commission of inquiry into atrocities committed in East Timor in 1999. More junior figures in Appendix 5 of the final report are added here under their superiors.

See map of location

This individual is also mentioned in these profiles:
Cancio Lopes de Carvalho
Herminio da Costa
MajGen Adam Damiri
Manuel de Sousa
Eurico Guterres
Sera Malik
Igidio Manek
Natalino Monteiro
Col Nur Muis
Lafaek Saburai
Guilherme dos Santos
LtCol Burhanuddin Siagian
Joao Franca da Silva
BrigGen Mahidin Simbolon
Laurentino ('Moko') Soares
Domingos Soares
Abilio Soares
Col Tono Suratman
Lt Sutrisno
Gen Wiranto

[1] James Dunn, 'Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their nature and causes', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.

[2] James Dunn, 'Crmes against humanity in East Timor: Their nature and causes - Annex B - Select chronology May 1998 - October 1999', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.

[3] 'Panglima perang prointegrasi, Joao da Silva Tavares: Pro integrasi tetap pertahankan Merah Putih', Suara Timor Timur, approx 5 March 1999 (after 27 February 1999).

[4] 'Getting away with murder: A chronology of Indonesian military sponsored paramilitary and militia atrocities in East Timor from November 1998 to May 1999', East Timor International Support Center (ETISC), 15 May 1999.

[5] 'Rekayasa penembakan untuk diskreditkan Abri. Kelompok prokemerdekaan korbankan anggotanya sendiri', Media Indonesia, 22 March 1999; 'East Timor: Militia leader Joao Tavares denied responsibility for murder of four civilians', Lusa, 25 March 1999; 'Civilians shot dead in East Timor', CNRT Press Release, 20 March 1999. The dead were Pedro Assamali (30), Domingos Manomau (25), Joao Ruben Barros (11), and Fonseca Gomes (11). Four others were wounded. Tavares claimed Fretilin did the shooting.

[6] James Dunn, 'Crmes against humanity in East Timor: Their nature and causes - Annex B - Select chronology May 1998 - October 1999', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.

[7] Hamish McDonald, 'Architects of mass murder', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.

[8] 'Rumah wartawan STT dihancurkan', MateBEAN, 29 April 1999; 'Empat wartawan diburu Kopassus', MateBEAN, 29 April 1999.

[9] 'Anggota milisi jadi caleg Golkar', MateBEAN, 15 June 1999.

[10] 'Instruksi PPI tentang kesiapan dan kesiagaan pasukan pejuang integrasi', MateBEAN, 1 August 1999; 'Solidamor> Surat rahasia Asmenko I/Poldagri', MateBEAN, 17 July 1999; 'Skenario bumi hangus TNI dijalankan di Timor Timur', MateBEAN, 9 September 1999. One report says General Wiranto personally slapped JoaoTavares in the face for 'embarrassing the armed forces' when this letter was widely leaked to the public ('Panglima pejuang integrasi ditampar Jenderal Wiranto', MateBEAN, 5 August 1999). Unamet considered it a fake (Geoffrey Robinson, 'The fruitless search for a smoking gun: Tracing the origins of violence in East Timor,' in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad, eds. Historical roots of political violence in contemporary Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press, forthcoming (2002)).

[11] 'Kekerasan masih berlangsung di Timtim: Komnas HAM: Cabut status darurat militer', Kompas, 9 September 1999; 'RI bahas masuknya pasukan perdamaian', Kompas, 12 September 1999.

[12] 'Bersama PPI siap mati', Gamma, 10 October 1999; Derwin Pereira, 'Inside Aitarak's jungle hideout', Straits Times [Singapore], 10 October 1999.

[13] 'Joao Tavares threatens Cancio and co.' (English translation), Radar Timor, 30 October 2000.

[14] Joanna Jolly, 'Militia pay-day linked to attack and rise in forays', South China Morning Post, 13 December 2000.

[15] Case 2/ 2001, Serious Crimes trial documents (

[16] Serious Crimes case number not yet allocated in 2002.

[17] 'HAK: Laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999 (1)', MateBEAN, 25 May 1999. The victims were Antonio Bazilio (26, student), and Armando Belaku (50).

[18] Peter Bartu, 'The militia, the military, and the people of Bobonaro', pp.73-90 in Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R Shalom (eds), Bitter flowers, sweet flowers:East Timor, Indonesia and the world community, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p78.

[19] James Dunn, 'Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their nature and causes', Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 2001.

[20] 'Rela mati demi leluhur', Gamma, 24 October 1999.

[21] 'East Timor Centre for Human Rights Information, Education and Training, ETCHRIET (Human Rights Report N-:6 /95), 8 September 1995; 'East timor: Stop bank loans until militias disarmed', Human Rights Watch, 20 April 1999.

[22] 'East Timor: No solution without respect for human rights - Bi-annual report of human rights violations in East Timor, January to June, 1998', East Timor Human Rights Centre (SR1/98, Part 2), 18 August 1998. Was this the same incident as one reported for 'early 1998', when his Halilintar troops killed five suspected pro-independence minded villagers in Aidabalete, Bobonaro district? The Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) looked into this event but nothing further was done. See another reference to Aidabalete below. 'Laporan situasi Ham Timor Timur April 1999', Yayasan HAK, 25 May 1999.

FW: Job - Treasury Advisor

Like the Titanic - the PFMCBP sails on....

between $250.000.00 and $500,000.00 for this position?

14 days notice for applying for this high profile and high responsibility position.

Qualified candidates - will they even learn it is available, and will they be interested?

From: [] On Behalf Of ETAN
Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2009 11:15 PM
Subject: Job - Treasury Advisor



Application Procedure

Please visit our website at to learn about our recruitment process and your application requirements including how to address the Selection Criteria in your application:

Applications need to be sent to our Programme Implementation Officer-PFMCBP at email address,, no later than
17:00hours Timor-Leste time on 25th June 2009.

Only short-listed candidates will be contacted. Please note that applications received after the deadline will not be considered.


Job Title: Treasury Adviser

Reporting to: National Director of Treasury
Director-General of State Finances
Senior Management Adviser, State Finances
PIO (for contractual and administrative purposes)

Counterpart staff: National Director of Treasury

12 months, with possibility of extension up to 1 July 2011 based on the adviser’s performance and the Ministry’s needs

Location: Ministry of Finance, Dili – Timor Leste

I. Background

Planning and Finance Management Systems in Timor-Leste

Since the restoration of independence in 2002, the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL) has made steady progress in building its Planning and Finance Management (PFM) systems, but significant challenges remain. Institutions responsible for planning, budgeting, budget execution, revenue collection, internal control and reporting are particularly weak in a context of rapidly accumulating revenues and expansion of the state budget. The PFM system is characterized by extremely low budget execution on a cash basis, caused by low capacity within the civil service and weaknesses in planning, budgeting, procurement, implementation and project management. Progress to convert existing resources into economic growth and tangible service delivery improvements is slow.

Strengthening PFM in any country is a long-term agenda. Sound PFM requires government wide systems and processes that operate in a fully integrated manner; weak links must be addressed in a systematic manner. Areas requiring immediate attention include:
- Linking planning and budgeting
- Reform of procurement and devolution to the line agencies
- Improving cash planning and cash management to prevent excessive Treasury liquidity
- Strengthening core IT systems to support the budget process
- Improving internal and external controls and monitoring
- Implementation of a comprehensive program of capacity building and professional development for civil servants including delivery of incentive and reward reforms.

The GoTL is conscious of the key role of PFM systems for growth, service delivery and poverty reduction, and has commenced implementation of a Planning and Finance Management Capacity Building Program (PFMCBP) to assist to secure these objectives.

The Planning and Financial Management Capacity Building Program

The PFMCBP aims to achieve sustainably strengthened planning, budgeting, public expenditure management and revenue administration for growth and poverty reduction, with emphasis on efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, integrity, service culture, and transparency.

Funded through a World Bank multi-donor trust fund, the PFMCBP is a five year coordinated program of targeted capacity building in planning and financial management. The key GoTL implementing agency is the Ministry of Finance (MoF), but PFMCBP also includes support for financial management staff in the line ministries and districts. The program comprises four major components, encompassing: (a) public expenditure management; (b) revenue administration and macro-economic management; (c) support for executive management and other cross cutting activities; and (d) support for program implementation.

Early capacity building initiatives in the MoF focused largely on getting the public financial management system up and running without fully addressing the capacity shortfalls of civil servants. This has created a system that remains heavily reliant on the presence of international advisers, who have largely focused on in-line performance and, to a limited extent, on the transfer of skills. Through PFMCBP the GoTL wants to move beyond the transitional substitution of international for local expertise, to an integrated approach to institution building that relies on three pillars: skills and knowledge; systems and processes; and attitudes and behaviours. Based on the three-pillar framework, the objectives for the PFM function are (i) improved service delivery, both to internal clients and to the population; and (ii) to create a sustainable PFM system that would be increasingly managed and run by national staff, with the number of advisers decreasing over time as national staff take on increasing responsibility. To achieve this, the Program has adopted a “platform” approach under which first steps and foundations are consolidated before more advanced steps are attempted.

PFMCBP faces two central challenges in the near term. The first challenge will be to creatively and flexibly support elaboration and implementation of the change management strategy by the RWG, task teams and senior management team. It will take time to define and communicate elements of the change process: it must not proceed too quickly, or according to a technical blueprint. The second challenge will be to ensure the program does not lose focus on the pressing need to improve the Ministry’s core public finance management responsibilities and maintain operations. Government capacity is already limited and there is a risk that dramatic changes may divert focus. PFMCBP should target activities that improve service delivery, support economy and employment outcomes, and underpin government’s efforts to establish its legitimacy.

Program Management

The program is managed and implemented by the MoF through a dedicated Program Implementation Unit (PIU), led by the Program Implementation Officer (PIO). Comprising a core group of TA management specialists, the PIU ensures best practice capacity building efforts throughout the program. The PIU is located within the Executive Office of the Ministry of Finance, and is designated part responsibility for aid effectiveness also, together with associated PIUs in MoF.

A Steering Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance and involving senior managers, key line agencies and district representatives as appropriate will provide the strategic direction for the program and ensuring that the program progresses in line with the Government’s development and public financial management objectives.

A Supervisory Committee Chaired by the Minister of Finance and comprising the World Bank and one or more development partners will monitor progress in program implementation and make recommendations to the Steering Committee on issues affecting the successful achievement of the program’s objectives. The Supervision Committee will provide a forum for continuous policy dialogue and will oversee and advice on the integration of all activities and advisers within the program framework, including coordination and consultation with donors involved in parallel financing and co-financing

All Technical Advisers recruited to the PFMCBP are contracted by, and accountable to, the Minister of Finance. Senior Management Advisors will be responsible for planning and monitoring the quality of performance of TA assigned to their respective branches and units.

Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance is the Government body responsible for the design, execution, coordination and assessment of the finance policies defined and approved by the Council of Ministers, particularly in the areas of budget and finance, and the Government’s annual planning and monitoring of their programs.

In 2008, the Ministry of Finance embarked on a process for institutional reform that aimed to improve the quality of services that the Ministry provides to policy-makers, line ministries and districts. The new Organic Law was approved in January 2009 which paved the way for the establishment of four (4) General Directorates, namely, i) General Directorate of State Finances; ii) General Directorate of Revenue & Customs; iii) General Directorate of Policy Analysis & Research, and (iv) General Directorate of Administration and Finance. The Organic Law also approved the creation of 12 National Directorates positioned under each of the four (4) General Directorates.

A Senior Management Committee has also been established to transmit reform messages and lead in the performance improvements within the Ministry. The team is composed of the Minister, the Vice-Minister of Finance, the Chief of Staff of the Minister of Finance, the Senior Management Advisers (SMAs-International) of the four (4) General Directorates and the Director-Generals (Timorese) as they are appointed on the interim or recruited and appointed to the position, on permanent capacity.

III. Objectives of the Assignment

The Budget Execution Department within the National Directorate of Treasury is undergoing significant reform. This is because previously this was the hub of the centralised Treasury operations. This is in line with the Government decision to decentralise some of the Treasury functions and move the operations away from centralised control and towards a more risk management approach.

Following the successful re-structure of the Ministry and the appointment of a new Director for the National Directorate it is important that, as process and functions get devolved, the Treasury staff be assisted in this transition.

At the moment there are three technical advisers within the National Directorate, the lead adviser to the Director is supplied from the IMF. There are currently two advisers from the PFMCBP one working on the FMIS and Asset registers and the other on account reconciliation. Both inputs have been highly successful in meeting the needs of the Treasury at the time.
Future inputs have been designed to be more in line with the upcoming needs of Treasury and will be focussed more on managing and embedding the internal process of change and focussing a little more on internal audit.

The input on reconciliation is due to end in Q2 2009. Whilst the accounts have now been reconciled and brought up to date there remain problems with the computer software that will not have been resolved at the end of the assignment. This combined with the revised decentralised responsibilities will require some process changes and training of core staff specifically within the Budget Execution Division.

The other significant objective of this assignment will be to effect the internal process change away from centralised management of cash purchase vouchers and purchase orders and to move to decentralised systems affected by the line Ministries and monitored by the execution department.

The Government has agreed to this change but it has not been implemented due to systems and legal constraints that have now been overcome. As the new processes are introduced and local counterpart staff trained these processes will also form a key component of the revised Treasury manual that is being compiled by the IMF adviser.

IV. Duties and responsibilities
The Adviser will provide both operational support and capacity building to Treasury staff as follows:

A. Core Tasks

· Assist in the production of a consolidated Treasury manual
· This work is being coorindated by the incumbent IMF adviser and so this input will focus particularly on the integration of freebalance procedures and screens, especially in regard to budget execution and risk management reports into the manual
· Assistance to the Budget Execution Department
· In particular to map out and review internal processes with a view of execution and introducing new risk management based processes and procedures.
· Strengthen the process of regular bank reconciliation between Treasury and the BPA and between Treasury and the commercial banks, in particular work with the Freebalance software team to make sure that internal processes and the software are consistent.
· Strengthen the process of revenue reconciliation between BPA and Treasury and Tax and Customs Directorates and the Treasury.
· Strengthen the process of accounting for retirement of advances to line ministries, districts and embassies and advise on the process of decentralisation of Treasury functions to Districts
· Work closely with the FMIS Training consultant to ensure a co-ordinated approach and provide input to training manuals
· Support to the increased use of the upgraded FMIS within Treasury with a particular focus on;
· Tracking expenditures related to projects and programs of Government
· Entrenching the use of PB reports within Treasury

B. Capacity Building functions

· The Adviser will be expected to incorporate the three pillar approach to capacity building in all aspects of his/her work with Timorese counterparts. The Adviser shall model transparency and accountability in his/her own behavior, and by focusing on development of skills and systems, together with support to behavioral and attitudinal change, the adviser shall help to build capacity:
· Jointly with the Program Implementation Officer and the HR & CB Adviser, develop an agreed capacity building workplan (based on the Adviser’s own workplan), to incorporate operational activities and capacity building into the core specific activities to be undertaken. Regularly review and revise the workplan;
· Agree on specific tasks within activities for which national counterparts will be responsible; agree on methodology and monitorable indicators for assessing progress on agreed tasks, and for providing feedback to staff;
· Increase, incrementally, the level and number of tasks for which national incumbents are responsible, commensurate with progress/improvements in technical and functional capabilities.

C. Deliverables

Within the first three (3) weeks of the assignment, the Treasury Adviser shall prepare a Workplan based on the objectives of the assignment and specific functions for approval by the the Treasury Director; copy furnished to the PIO-PFMCBP, on the progress and /or completion of the activities outlined in the Work Plan.

Within the first six (6) weeks of the assignment, the Treasury Adviser shall prepare a capacity building workplan, as outlined above. This will be prepared in consultation with human resource development staff and the HR&Capacity Building Adviser.

The Treasury Adviser shall then provide a duly endorsed monthly Workplan Progress Report to the Treasury Director; copy furnished to the PIO-PFMCBP, on the progress and /or completion of the activities outlined in the Work Plan.

In the first year of the assignment, the deliverables of the Treasury Adviser shall include, among others:
o Training and capacity building of local counterparts
o Report based on an effective review assessing current risk management based processes to be submitted three months after the assignment has commenced
o Design of risk management based processes within Treasury, including an implementation action plan to be submitted four months after commencement of the assignment
o Support the production of an updated consolidated Treasury manual
o Support the production and use of regular Treasury reports on Freebalance

In addition, the Treasury Adviser shall discuss and submit to the Treasury Director, no later than five (5) working days before the end of the current contract, an end of assignment Workplan Progress Report summarizing work undertaken against the Workplan, the degree to which the work has concluded, and a statement of outstanding tasks.

V. Qualifications and Competencies

Technical Competencies

· Degree/ Advanced Diploma in Accounts or Finance
· Minimum of eight (8) years of technical experience working in government accounts and finance in the areas of treasury and financial management information systems.
· At least three (3) years experience in supervision, control and implementation of government accounts and treasury functions specifically in the areas of government accounts, Financial Management Information Systems and external & internal audit process and the development and presentation of external and internal reporting to Government, Ministers, managers within the civil service, donors and other external users including the public.
· Knowledge and understanding of International Monetary Fund’s GFS guidelines and procedures, International Public Accounting Standards and procedures.
· Knowledge and understanding of generally accepted International Accounting Standards, practices and procedures and reporting requirements.
· Sound understanding of governance issues as they relate to financial transaction processes and data capture, reporting, fraud and mismanagement identification and control.
· Detailed experience in the secure management of user access to financial systems and information, information management, reporting and the maintenance of data integrity
· Experience in imparting training and conduct of workshops and seminars.
· Demonstrated computer literacy possessing skills in operation of MS Windows, Word, Excel, Power Point software, detailed experience in the specialist use of Freebalance and preferably one other internationally recognized FMIS application.
· Excellent command of English language both spoken and written. Knowledge of Portuguese and/or Tetum would be a distinct advantage.
· Work experience in developing countries particularly in Timor-Leste or in multicultural intrnational organizations would be an advantage.

Capacity Building
Competencies and Experiences

The adviser should be able to demonstrate experience in developing and delivering outcomes based capacity building activities, from the needs analysis stage through to execution, evaluation and analysis of ongoing support requirements.

The adviser should be familiar with the principles and techniques involved with adult learning, and understand capacity building methodologies.

The adviser must posess excellent oral and written communication skills and be experienced in designing and providing on-the-job training.

In addition:
· A commitment to supporting Timorese staff to achieve the outcomes and objectives of the Ministry;
· Committed to training and promoting the professional development of the Ministry’s staff;
· Recognition and respect of peers, and a demonstrated ability to interact effectively and collegially with peers at all levels;
· Demonstrated ability to make sound judgments on capacity issues that will require management referral and guidance;
· Demonstrated ability to work effectively in a mentoring role;
· Demonstrated ability to communicate ideas and analyses clearly and tactfully, both orally and in writing;
· Demonstrated ability to assist and support the development of useful processes and procedures within the unit to implement effectively the work program;
· Demonstrated ability to transfer skills and knowledge to counterparts in a culturally appropriate and effective manner – previous training or teaching experience a plus;
· Demonstrated ability to adapt to challenges in the workplace, including finding creative solutions; and,
· Familiarity with Timor-Leste and Timorese culture and/or willingness to acquire it.

VI. Performance Evaluation

Ongoing performance shall be assessed by the Programme Implementation Unit (PIU) in accordance with the functions and agreed deliverables in the TOR and performance review framework for advisors; and be subject to inputs and recommendations from the Steering and Supervisory Committees, joint supervision missions and the World Bank Task Team as appropriate.

Satisfactory execution of the indicated technical and capacity building functions mentioned above consistent with the Program’s objectives as evaluated by a Supervisory Review Committee at the end of the engagement. Where a contract extension is required, performance assessment results will be taken into consideration.


Please refer to our application guideline for how to address these:

Selection Criteria

Degree/ Diploma in Accounting /Finance

At least 8 years of technical experience working in government accounts and finance in the areas of treasury and financial management information systems.

Strong track record of working in a capacity building role, having demonstrated the ability to build skills and knowledge of counterparts in a culturally appropriate and effective manner.

At least 3 years experience in supervision, control and implementation of government accounts and treasury functions specifically in the areas of government accounts, Financial Management Information Systems and external & internal audit process and the development and presentation of external and internal reporting to Government, Ministers, managers within the civil service, donors and other external users including the public.

Knowledge and understanding of generally accepted International Accounting Standards, practices and procedures and reporting requirements.

Detailed experience in the secure management of user access to financial systems and information, information management, reporting and the maintenance of data integrity.

Work experience in developing countries particularly in Timor-Leste or in multicultural international organizations would be an advantage.

Fluency in English and
Fluency in Tetum/ Portuguese or other languages spoken in Timor Leste desirable